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Notes and Comments
Shimon Shetreet*

Time Standards for Justice

I. Introduction
The machinery of justice is under great pressures both popular and
professional to expedite justice. While the attainment of expeditious
justice is a generally accepted goal, the meaning of expeditious
justice is unsettled and ambiguous. The struggle for expediting
justice may have a limited significance if the goal is expressed in
ambiguous and general terms. Hence it is important to go beyond
the words, to establish standards for expeditious justice and as far as
practicable, to express them in numerical terms.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the possible reference
points for measuring court delay and to discuss the numerical
standards of expeditious justice.
II. Measuringdelay: For whom the clock ticks
Expeditious justice is the antonym of delayed justice; when justice
is not delayed it is expeditious. But how do we measure delay? At
what point does the meter of delay start to tick? Whose delay is it?
Or to put it metaphorically, for whom does the clock tick?
There are several reference points which may be used for accurate
measurement of the duration of judicial proceedings for determining
court delay. First, the event precipitating the court action; second,
the filing of the action; third, the date of readiness of all parties to
the proceedings to proceed to trial; fourth, the trial; fifth, the date of
final disposition of the case, i.e., the judgement. One can add a
sixth reference point which truly reflects the final disposition from
the litigants' point of view: the date of execution of the judgement.
As might be expected, there is some controversy over how to
count delay in court and from which of these points we should
*S. Shetreet, LL.B., LL.M., (Hebrew University); M.C.L., D.C.L., (University
of Chicago); member of the Faculty of Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem;
Research Fellow, Canadian Institute for Administration of Justice; Visiting
Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba 1977-1978.
This is a revised text of a section in the background paper prepared for the
Conference on Expeditious Justice, of the Canadian Institute for the Administration
of Justice, Edmonton, October 1978. I am indebted to the Research Board of the
University of Manitoba for their support. I gratefully acknowledge the kind
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begin.' While it is generally agreed that delay should not be
measured from the date of occurrence of the precipitating event, it is
not a wholly irrelevant point of reference. As Lord Justice Edmund
Davies said in Kerr v. National Carriers (1974), it might become

legally relevant.
It is the duty of parties to present their cases with reasonable
promptness, and it is by no means to be regarded as irrelevant in
every case that a claimant has let a substantial time pass before
initiating proceedings. If he does, he runs the risk of having that
delay taken into consideration against him if he later seeks
indulgence from the court even though his proceedings2 were
initiated strictly within the statutory period (of limitation).
The date of filing of the pleadings is widely used as the starting
point for measuring delay. This is based on the assumption that such
filing indicates the litigants' readiness to proceed. However, this
date may be misleading since the parties may not be ready for trial
until discovery is complete and all preliminary matters and motions
are determined. Here it is important to distinguish between two
different meanings of the term "delay" in the context of court
proceedings. "One refers to the waiting time exacted of litigants
who are ready and eager to go ahead when the court is not because
other cases have priority. That is court-system delay. The other kind
is the delay which the lawyers create through their own unreadiness
or unwillingness to proceed. This is a lawyer-caused delay.' While it is recognized that the lapse of time between filing and
readiness for trial is due to lawyers or other factors unrelated to the
Court system, the Courts are not altogether relieved from their
responsibility for delay at this stage of the proceedings. Court
statistics normally take filing of pleadings as a point from which
delay is measured; court rules expect the courts to strike out actions
for want of prosecution after a certain period. 4 Indeed, judicial
assistance which I received in the course of my research from many judges and
court officers across Canada and from my colleagues at the Faculty of Law,
University of Manitoba. The responsibility, however, is exclusively mine.
1. See generally Ziesel, Kalven and Buchultz, Delay in the Courts (1959) at ch. 4;
E. Friesen et al., Managingthe Courts (Indianapolis: Bobb-Merrill, 1971
2. Kerr v. National CarriersLtd., [1974] 1 Lloyd's L. Reps. 365 at 366 (C.A.)
3. M. Rosenburg, "Court Congestion: Status, Causes and Proposed Remedies" in
H. Jones, ed., The Courts, the Public and the Law Explosion (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965) at 29 and 32. See also Report on Administration of
Ontario Courts (Ontario Law Reforrn Commission, 1973) Part 1 at 274
4. Rule 284 of the Manitoba Queen's Bench Rules; Rule 28.11 of the Nova Scotia
Civil Procedure Rules
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decisions have long recognized the supervising duty of the courts to
scrutinize cases and exercise control over lawyer- (or litigants-)
caused delay between filing and readiness, for example, by strict
rulings on requests for adjournments, by dismissal of actions for
want of prosecution, or by resorting to the doctrine of abuse of
process. 5
It is beyond dispute that the court is responsible for delays from
the point the parties are ready to proceed to trial as reflected by the
filing of a certificate of readiness and possibly by a notice to set
down for trial. From that point on to trial and later to the final
determination of the case, the delay falls within the court's
responsibility, even though it is sometimes caused by factors which
are beyond its control.
If we apply this general approach to the criminal process the
following picture will emerge as to the responsibility for delay
between the various reference points. 6 The delay between the
commission of an offence and its reporting cannot be attributed to
any public agency; the public, in general, bears the responsibility.
The elapsed time from the reporting of the crime to the arrest of the
suspect is the responsibility of the Police. From arrest to filing of the
criminal charge into the court, the delay should be attributed to the
Police, the prosecution and witnesses. Only from the point that the
charge is filed does the court begin to share or bear full
responsibility for delay. From filing of the charge to trial, the delay
may be caused by the Court, by the crown attorney, by defence
counsel, witnesses, and the Police, if it is responsible for the
custody of the accused. When the trial is completed, the court bears
the full responsibility for delay between the end of the trial and the
judgement.
III. Numerical standardsfor expeditiousjustice
We have indicated when the meter of delay should start to tick, but
we still have to determine when the duration of court proceedings
becomes unacceptable and exceeds the reasonable limit. Unacceptable delay can be defined as an abnormal or extraordinary amount of
5. See, e.g., Davis v. Wright (1914), 24 Man. R. 205 (C.A.);Russell v. Glassman
(1959), 66 Man. R. 464 (C.A.); Shura v. Silver (1963), 43 W.W.R. 272 (Man.
C.A.); Kerr v. National Carriers Ltd., [1974] 1 Lloyd's L. Reps. 365 (C.A.);
Dutten v. Spink, [1977] 1 All E.R. 287 (C.A.); R. v. Rourke (1977), 35 C.C.C.
129 (S.C.C.); R. v. Bjorklund (1977), 39 C.R.N.S. 346 (B.C.S.C.)
6. Cf. H. More, Criminal Justice Management (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing
Co., 1977) at 182
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elapsed time between the relevant reference points: filing and trial,
readiness and trial, filing and final disposition, readiness and final
disposition. The real issue lies in defining normal time or reasonable
time for criminal or civil trials.
Generally, normal time depends on the circumstances in each
court and in each case, and cannot be stated in numerical terms
which will be appropriate for each court and all cases. 7 This is the
underlying assumption reflected in judicial decisions dealing with
delay both in criminal and civil proceedings. 8 Indeed, this appears
clearly from the wide disparity between the duration of proceedings
in large urban centres and in the sparsely populated rural areas.
The practical difficulties of divising a uniform time limit are not
accepted as sufficient excuse for not quantifying the normal time for
judicial proceedings. The proponents of a uniform time limit
dismiss the assumption that diversity of circumstances in each court
should affect the justice that a litigant should be entitled to expect.
As the Report on Administration of Ontario Courts said, "a litigant
at one trial centre should not have to wait significantly longer time
for a trial date than a litigant at another centre". 9 Moreover, with
respect to criminal process, legislatures in many jurisdictions
consider it necessary to express their perception of expeditious
justice in numerical terms applicable to all courts. The statutory
time limits are established in relation to certain reference points in
the criminal process.
The Canadian Criminal Code prescribes a directory time limit in
relation to the period from arrest to trial. From Section 459 of the
Code, it appears that Parliament considers it desirable that the
accused who is in custody should be brought to trial within 90 days
in case of indictable offences and within 30 days in case of summary
convictions. This standard, however, is not effectively enforced.
The mechanism to promote compliance with this time limit is
judicial review of the custody. The result is that the 90- or 30-day
time limit is a compulsory period between arrest and a hearing on
the possible release of the accused; the trial itself may be held at a
later date subject to no time limit. This appears to be the
0
interpretation supported by the courts as illustrated by R. v. Dass.'
7. A.B.A. StandardsRelating to Speedy Trial (1968) at 14
8. See the American speedy trial cases, e.g., United States v. Marion (1971), 92

S.Ct. 455. Also see cases cited in note 5, supra, and note 19, infra
9. OntarioReport, supra, note 3, Part I at 278

10. [1978] 2 W.W.R. 274 (Man. C.A.). For the statutory provisions see Criminal
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In Canada then, we do not know in definite terms what is the
legislative judgment on the numerical standards for expeditious
criminal justice.
In other jurisdictions, legislatures have expressed the perception
of expeditious criminal process in more compelling terms. In the
United States, the prescribed time limits for the period from date of
arrest to date of trial range from 75 days in California to 6 months in
Pennsylvania. 1 ' In the Federal Courts, the Speedy Trial Act 1974
provides for a goal of a maximum period of 100 days to bring a
defendant to trial after arrest.' 2 This goal is to be achieved in
graduate process; longer time limits are provided for in the interim
period. The American judiciary found the final goal of 100 days
almost unattainable and have called for increasing the period to 180
days. 13 The Israeli Criminal Procedure Law prescribes the time
limit, in cases where the accused is in custody, in relation to the first
arrest and filing of charge, which is set at 90 days, the filing of the
charge and commencement of trial, which is set at 60 days, and the
first arrest and the judgment in the case, for which a time limit of
one year is set. 14
The sanctions for enforcing the time limits vary; dismissal of the
charge with or without prejudice as in the American Speedy Trial
Act 15 , automatic release from custody on reasonable conditions set
by the court, as in New York 16 or a requirement of special
permission from a judge of the highest court of the jurisdiction to
allow the continuance in custody of the accused after the expiry of
the time limit, as is the practice in Israel. 17 It should be noted that
even jurisdictions which provide for mandatory time limits and
extreme sanctions such as dismissal of the charge, allow for
8
justifiable delays. '
We are seeking expeditious justice, not speedy justice; the
Code, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c.2, s.5. See s.459(1) (a) for indictable offences
and s.459 (1) (b) for summary conviction offences
11. Ca. Penal Code 1382 (West 1970); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, 781 (1964). For
other references see More, supra, note 6 at 178
12. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, (Feb. 1975) 18 U.S.C.A. 5.3161
13. See the resolution of the Federal Judicial Conference, (1977), 63 A.B.A.J.
1643
14. See Yadin, ed., The Israeli Criminal Procedure Law (1967) at pp. 24-25,
secs. 46-48
15. 18 U.S.C.A. s.3. 162
16. McKinney's N.Y. Criminal Code, s. 303(2)
17. Yadin, supra, note 14 at p. 25, s. 49
18. 18U.S.C.A.s.3.161(h)
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essential ingredient of timely disposition, as the United States
Supreme Court put it, is "orderly expedition, not mere speed." 19
This general guideline applies both to criminal and civil
proceedings. Time limits are more common in criminal matters, but
we can find expressions in numerical terms of expeditious justice in
civil matters as well. The Ontario Law Reform Commission Report
on Administration of Ontario Courts proposed a standard of 6
months waiting time from filing to trials in the High Court. 20 The
Report also recommends that the disposition of the case, from filing
2
of the action to judgement, should be complete within one year. '
The American Bar Association Standards for Trial Courts2 2 provide
for a standard of 6 months from filing to trial with shorter time
limits for cases of child custody, support of dependents, or
commitment to an institution, in which 45 days from filing are
recommended as the time standard.
An expression of the perception on the numerical standards for
expeditious justice can be found in the Court Rules of Some
provinces. Rule 284 of the Queen's Bench Rules of Manitoba
provides that if the action is at issue 2 months before the
commencement of any sitting of the Court for which the plaintiff
might give notice of trial and he fails to do so, the action may be
dismissed for want of prosecution. Under Rule 97, the action
becomes at issue when the last pleading is filed.
In Nova Scotia, pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 28.11, a
general list is maintained of all those cases where defences have
been filed for more than 6 months and procedures have been
established to ensure that such cases are brought to hearing without
the Solicitors requesting that those cases be set down for trial. Rule
28.11 (4) of the Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules provides for 2
years as the maximum period for a case to be on the General List.
Rule 323 of the Ontario Rules of Practice establishes that an
action to be tried without a jury at Toronto must be set down for trial
by the plaintiff within 6 weeks after the pleadings are closed. If the
plaintiff does not do so and does not proceed to trial, according to
the Practice Rules the action may be dismissed for want of
prosecution. In all other actions, the plaintiff must give notice and
19. Smith v. United States (1959), 360 U.S. 1 at 10 (U.S.C.A. 5th Circ.); Barker
v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514 (U.S.C.A. 6th Circ.)
20. Ontario Report, supra, note 3, Part 1at 279
21. Id. at 13
22. A.B.A. Standards, Trial Courts (1976) at p. 93, s. 2.52
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enter the action for trial if the pleadings are closed 6 weeks before
the commencement of any sittings for which he might enter the
action. If the plaintiff does not comply with these limits, then by
Rule 324 (1), the action may be dismissed for want of prosecution.
There are also time limits for rendering decisions on matters
under judicial submission. The Quebec Code of Civil Procedure and
Ontario Rules of Practice provide that if a judgment is not rendered
within a period of 6 months, the Chief Justice may order a retrial or
a rehearing. 23 This implicitly sets the standard of 6 months for the
period from the date of end of hearing to the date of judgment. Six
months is an excessively long time limit for delivery of judgement,
although admittedly it is only the maximum period which will call
for the extreme sanction of retrial of the case. An Amendment in
1973 of the Israeli Rule of Civil Procedure provides for a more
restrictive time limit for delivery of judgement at the trial level.
Rule 213 sets the time limit of 30 days from end of hearing to
delivery of judgement, absent special reasons. In Sweden, the
judges are expected to render judgement 14 days after trial and in
Norway, after 3 days. 2 4 The ABA Standards recommend that a
decision should be rendered no later than 30 days after
submission. 2 5 Appellate courts should, of course, be allowed longer
time to deliberate their decisions. The ABA Standards provide for
an objective of 30 days, maximum time of 60 days in three judges
panel and in larger panels for a time limit of 60-90 days depending
6
on the complexity of the case. 2
IV. Conclusion
Time standards for disposition of cases in courts should be set in a
careful process which will take into account the various and
sometimes conflicting factors. They should therefore reflect a
balancing process between the salient factors such as: "facilitating
vigorous enforcement of the criminal law, protecting individuals
from prolonged pre-trial detention, promptly resolving legal
uncertainty in cases involving personal status, affording litigants
adequate opportunity to reach a negotiated settlement, and allowing
23. Code of Civil Procedure, S.Q. 1965, Vol. 11, c.80, s.465; Ontario Rules of
Practice, s. 401
24. Israel Report of Committee on Simplifying and Improving Procedure in

PersonalInjury Cases (1972) at ss. 216, 217 - Berinson Report
25. A.B.A. Standards, Trial Courts (1976) at p. 94 , s. 2.52
26. Id. at commentary p. 94, s.2.52
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adequate opportunity for preparation for trial." As different
jurisdictions may attach different weight to the various factors, the
time standards differ from one jurisdiction to the other. What
matters is that some maximum time standards are laid down and that
effective mechanism is established for their enforcement. However,
the standards should not be set at unattainable levels, and they
should allow for departure in carefully defined circumstances which
call for extended time limits.
Furthermore, it must always be kept in mind that the time
standards are not separate elements in the administration of justice.
The rate or speed at which a case should be processed is only one
element of a three-component equation; the other two are: the
workload or the number of cases to be disposed of, and the physical
and fiscal capacity of the court to do the work. Legislatures who set
higher standards of timely disposition should also be prepared to
expand the physical and fiscal ability of the courts, since the
27
increase in caseload is not normally controllable.
27. J.F. Doyle, "Speedy
Judges J.38

Trial Legislation: The Happy Dilusion" (1978),

17

